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Beside the Twisted Road
In his study Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass
Murder, Alex J. Kay aptly characterizes Nazi Ger-
many’s occupation of parts of the Soviet Union as
“organized chaos.” Immediately noting the “admin-
istrative chaos, interagency competition and wide-
ranging policy disputes” of the Third Reich, much
of Kay’s detailed analysis, which draws on an im-
pressive amount of primary source material, leads to
the conclusion that“German occupation policy in the
Soviet Union was built from the beginning on shaky
foundations due to a fundamental disagreement re-
garding the practical approach to policy implemen-
tation” (pp. 1, 208). However, Kay also demon-
strates that “collaboration and cooperation between
the economic and political planners were more sys-
tematic, sustained and extensive than has hitherto
been thought” (p. 206). This encapsulates one of the
major valuable insights offered by this work, adding
to a field that has attracted increasing attention in
recent years. As Kay points out, several scholarly
publications have already engaged with the initially
overlooked issue of Nazi planning for the occupation;
however, the present volume provides the first sub-
stantial comparative analysis of the undertakings of
political and economic planners, highlighting the con-
formity and conflicts between them.
Of course, the unexpected turns that Germany’s
war in “the East” took, and the resultant failure of
Adolf Hitler’s Blitzkrieg, ensured that the Nazis’ plans
to establish a civil political administration were only
realized temporarily and in a relatively small area.
Nonetheless, Kay demonstrates that the political and
economic planning for the envisioned comprehensive
occupation of the Soviet Union is of crucial impor-
tance, revealing much about how the Nazi regime
functioned. In succinct, chronologically and themati-
cally structured chapters, Kay maps out the strategic
and ideological motives for the invasion; key institu-
tions and individual players involved (such as the pre-
viously marginalized figure of Alfred Rosenberg); and
the wider population policy dependent on the ideo-
logical aims of the SS, particularly in relation to the
ideas of Neuordnung and Hungerpolitik. Kay makes a
compelling case for the disorganization and deficien-
cies of the institutions involved being the result not
of any lack of detailed planning, but (combined with
the fact that major military activity never ceased) of
a lack of coordination and efficient implementation of
the policies set out: “In this sense, perhaps the roots
of the anarchy witnessed in German occupation pol-
icy can be found in the planning phase” (p. 2).
The importance of economic motives for the inva-
sion can be seen in the Nazi leadership’s anxiety over
a potential repeat of Germany’s downfall in World
War I, namely, in terms of the military catastrophe
of a war on two fronts and the dire lack of resources
on German soil sparked by a war of attrition. As Kay
points out: “Memories of the First World War, more
specifically what the Nazis saw as the decisive effect
of the British naval blockade on the supply of food
to the German home front and consequently on the
population’s morale, strength of resistance and be-
lief in ultimate victory, were particularly influential
in shaping the mentality, and subsequently in formu-
lating the policies, of the Nazi leadership in this mat-
ter” (p. 40). Kay states early in his book that along
with “the racial-ideological motivations which doubt-
less existed, there were also military and economic
considerations which played a major role in the de-
cision to invade,” and even goes so far as to claim in
his conclusion that “economic gain was the key mo-
tivation for waging war against the Soviet Union in
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mid-1941” (pp. 26, 200).
While strategic considerations such as this cer-
tainly played an important role, one gets the sense
at several points throughout Kay’s study, including
in the above quotations, that the crucial influence of
ideology is somewhat underplayed. Kay touches on
the fact that strategic and ideological factors were
intrinsically connected in such concepts as Leben-
sraum, noting that “ideological motives combined
with strategic and economic motivations” (p. 51).
However, the argument that the importance of “liv-
ing space” to Hitler’s thinking, which is evidenced
in many of his public pronouncements over a num-
ber of years, was sharply preceded by “agricultural-
economic and wider strategic arguments” for invad-
ing the Soviet Union and only gained serious weight
in the final months of 1940, is a point of con-
tention that unfortunately elicits limited discussion
(p. 27). Ju¨rgen Fo¨rster has shown the intertwined
nature of Hitler’s ideological and strategic goals to
be highly complex: “In the summer of 1940 Hitler
linked the realization of his twenty-year-old living-
space programme–which united expansion towards
the east, annihilation of Bolshevism, and extermina-
tion of Jewry–with the strategic necessity of secur-
ing the German sphere of power against the grow-
ing challenge of the Anglo-American naval powers.”[1]
This strong intersection between ideology and strat-
egy sometimes seems to elude Kay’s discussion of eco-
nomic and political planning. This is not a major
criticism of Kay’s thesis, only a point that perhaps
deserves further elaboration.
Kay also makes a useful contribution to existing
discussions of the Hungerpolitik, or “starvation strat-
egy,” which involved the planned forced removal of
vast amounts of food, particularly grain, from the
Soviet population, who would subsequently starve,
in the so-called deficit territories. In short, “the no-
tion of winning over the Soviet population would find
no place in Nazi Germany’s Hungerpolitik” (p. 57).
The other major concept Kay explores Neuordnung,
entails the German occupiers’ political and demo-
graphic restructuring of the Soviet Union. In a three-
tiered process that mirrored Nazi Germany’s earlier
invasion of Poland, which Christopher Browning has
summed up as “ethnic cleansing,” Kay reveals with
precision that the population policy comprised the
murder of “undesirables,” the expulsion of large num-
bers of Soviet civilians further eastward, and the re-
settlement of people of an “Aryan” persuasion into
the occupied territories (p. 96).[2] It is evident that
any course of action that was to be undertaken by the
Nazi occupiers grew increasingly genocidal in nature
over time, both in theory and practice.
In terms of the persecution of Soviet Jews, which
is admittedly far from the central focus of this book,
Kay’s interpretation of Nazi planning and the events
that transpired is clearly situated along a function-
alist or structuralist reading of the evolution of the
Holocaust. His analysis of the (in some cases be-
lated) economic and political preparations for the
German occupation of “the East,” even those that
were not implemented, have a significant place in the
historiographical debate. The functionalist perspec-
tive adhered to by Kay views the radicalization of
anti-Jewish measures more as a response to circum-
stances, encapsulated by the common metaphor of
a “twisted road” leading to Auschwitz. Functional-
ist historians portray the Third Reich as “a maze of
competing power groups, rival bureaucracies, forceful
personalities, and diametrically opposed interests en-
gaged in ceaseless clashes with each other,” and char-
acterize Hitler as a “brooding and sometimes distant
leader.”[3] Curiously, the role of the Fu¨hrer rarely as-
sumes such a guise in Kay’s narrative, which shows
that there were “concrete plans, concepts and inten-
tions on the part of Adolf Hitler” (p. 2).
In opposition to the functionalist perspective, in-
tentionalists argue that the extermination of Soviet
and European Jewry was the result of long-term plan-
ning and that Hitler was a prime instigator of Nazi
policy toward the Jews.[4] In his chapter on “Popula-
tion Policy,” Kay gives only very cursory attention to
the intentionalist perspective, which has vast impli-
cations for his overall argument. After surveying the
various nuances within the functionalist interpreta-
tions of the “decision” to murder all Soviet Jews, Kay
writes: “Indeed, it could well be the case that the Nazi
Leadership had the intention already prior to the in-
vasion to wipe out Soviet Jewry in its entirety, but
did not issue an explicit order to this effect due to its
own uncertainty as to how feasible this would prove to
be in practice” (p. 108, Kay’s emphasis). While I do
not intend to advocate an intentionalist position here,
this issue arguably warrants more detailed reflection.
Recent scholarship on the evolution of the Holocaust
has moved away from depicting the intentionalist and
functionalist arguments as polarized opposites, gen-
erally incorporating elements of both perspectives.
Much research in the past several years, particu-
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larly in relation to the active role of the Wehrmacht,
has stressed that Nazi leaders and military officers
conceived the waras one that would be characterized
by unprecedented brutality, while qualifying the func-
tionalist emphasis on the persecution of the Jews be-
ing solely a response to circumstances.[5] The crucial
role of ideology has been exposed in discussions of
events even prior to mid-1941, namely in the occupa-
tion of Poland.[6] While Kay rightly points out that
“the invasion of the Soviet Union was no purely ide-
ological impulse on the part of Hitler,” his view that
“a more calculated agenda with agricultural-economic
considerations” rested “at its core” could have been
strengthened by a more in-depth engagement with
the ideological facets of the invasion (p. 6). For ex-
ample, Kay’s assertion that “pursuing the ’starvation
policy’ [of Hungerpolitik ] was in the interests of the
Wehrmacht” due to their own imminent need for re-
sources perhaps overlooks the possibility that such
an arguably genocidal project might have inspired a
greater measure of ideological agreement within the
army as well (p. 132).
Kay provides a compelling exploration of Nazi
Germany’s political and economic planning for the
occupation of the Soviet Union in the year leading up
to and several months following the invasion. This
study is clearly structured and well presented, and
Kay takes care to note any limitations he faces due to
the inevitable gaps in the documentary record. Ap-
pealing to a diverse audience with interests ranging
from broad wartime strategic policy to the specifics
of Nazi Germany’s genocidal project, Exploitation,
Resettlement, Mass Murder provides many valuable
insights into what transpired along and beside the
“twisted road” to Auschwitz.
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